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Abstract

investigated the role of OC on absorptive capacity
and IT success [14], IT adoption and diffusion [7], IT
implementation [13], and user computer efficacy
[30]. Recently, OC has been discussed to be an enabler for new knowledge and trigger for creativity
[25], but also an obstacle regarding the adoption of
new digital services [12].
However, there is no dedicated work focusing on
firms’ OC when developing digital innovations.
Hence, our motivation for researching organizational
culture is promising and also in accordance with
Nambisan’s call that “the topic of innovation ecosystems (particularly digital innovations) is one that has
considerable contemporary significance” [20, p. 221].
OC may serve as a perspective on how we should
think about organizing for digital innovation. Drawing on the identified research gap, we formulate the
following research question:
What are the characteristics of an effective organizational culture in digitalizing firms?
We conducted exploratory case studies with 27
interviewees in eleven firms to understand their initiatives and managerial actions during digitalization.
The next section introduces the theoretical lens of
Schein which is then applied in our research approach explained in section 3. In section 4, we embed
our results into the levels of the OC model. A discussion of the main results is presented in section 5.

Whilst Information Systems research has focused
on how products, processes, and organizations have
to be transformed in the digital age, we know little
about how and why the organizational culture of
firms needs to be ‘digitalized’. Drawing on the organizational culture model by Edgar Schein, we analyze data from eleven cases across various industries
to identify the facets of digitalizing firms’ organizational cultures. Specifically, we explore their Artifacts, Espoused Beliefs and Values, and Underlying
Assumptions. Our study contributes by delineating a
‘digital organizational culture’ that underpins the
motivation for firms to digitalize.

1. Introduction
To successfully develop digital innovations, organizational culture is supposed to be a prerequisite
[31, 35]. Digital innovation refers to products that
combine digital and physical components [34]. We
term firms that pursue the development of such digital innovations as ‘digitalizing firms’. For example,
Tesla is a digitalizing firm as it has recently announced to equip every newly produced car (physical
component) with self-driving hardware and software
including ultrasonic sensors, cameras with 360degree visibility, and enhanced connectivity (digital
components). The development of such digital innovations is not possible without changing the basis of
the organization [20] and its culture [32]. Accordingly, Boynton and Zmud [4] recommend that firms
which undergo severe changes during digitalization
[35] should consider the importance of their Organizational Culture (OC) and its impact on IT. OC refers
to common values shared by individuals within an
organization [23]. OC originated from psychology
but has been adopted in IS research to explain effects
of culture on process management [11] or the impact
of IT on work environments [29]. Researchers have
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2. Theoretical Foundation
Schein defines organizational culture (OC) as “the
deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are
shared by members of an organization, that operate
unconsciously, and that define in a basic ‘taken-forgranted’ fashion an organization’s view of itself and
the environment” [26, p. 6]. In other words, OC provides unwritten and unspoken rules for how to get
along in the organization and conveys a sense of
identity to employees [6]. To understand OC, Edgar
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Schein [27] distinguishes between different levels
(i.e., Artifacts, Espoused Beliefs and Values, and
Underlying Assumptions) of culture according to the
degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to
the observer (cf. Table 1, Column 1: “Levels”). In the
following, these three levels are explained.

2.1. Artifacts
“Artifacts include the visible products of the
group, such as the architecture of its physical environment; its language; its technology and products;
its artistic creations; its style, as embodied in clothing, manners of address, and emotional displays; its
myths and stories told about the organization” [26, p.
24] but also “structural elements such as charters,
formal descriptions of how the organization works,
and organization charts also fall into the artifact level” [26, p. 25]. Particularly observing the latter aspect
allows recognizing an alteration of the structures
within digital organizations. Edgar Schein [26, p. 42]
exemplarily describes such artifacts in the following
scenario: “The company was organized in terms of
functional units and product lines, but there was a
sense of perpetual reorganization and a search for a
structure that would ‘work better’. Structure was
viewed as something to tinker with until one got it
right. There were many levels in the technical and
managerial hierarchy, but I got the sense that the hierarchy was just a convenience, not something to be
taken very seriously.”
In general, structural elements can be partitioned
into two areas dealing with the direct reorganization
of market activities (i.e. external structuring) and
indirect reorganization of the divisions (also known
as business units, i.e. internal structuring) within
which they reside [16].

2.2. Espoused Beliefs and Values
The second level of Edgar Schein’s model of OC
defines Espoused Beliefs and Values as the embraced
goals, ideals, norms, standards, and moral principles.
An example of values is described by Schein [26, p.
43] in the following situation: “Employees at all levels were responsible for thinking about what they
were doing and were enjoined at all times to ‘do the
right thing’, which, in many instances, meant being
insubordinate. If the boss asked you to do something
that you considered wrong or stupid, you were supposed to ‘push back’ and attempt to change the boss’s
mind. If the boss insisted, and you still felt that it was
not right, then you were supposed to not do it and
take your chances on your own judgment.” Espoused
Beliefs and Values are important because even the

best-designed digital strategy may fail if the company’s values do not embrace the transformation. For
instance, barriers evolve when employees resist transition towards digitalized customer channels or agile
development principles.
Bughin et al. [5] revealed a strong positive link
between values of a risk-taking culture and digital
performance. Digital workers are inevitably constrained or empowered by the norms of the organization’s values within which they work, particularly as
it relates to IT governance and the affordances of the
IT resources that they can access.

2.3. Underlying Assumptions
Third, Underlying Assumptions deal with occurrences that are inexplicable when insiders are asked
to outline their OC [27]. At this level, information
can only be indirectly collected through the observation of behavior and through triangulating data from
multiple sources. The reason is that the third level
consists of unconscious and taken-for-granted conceptions and basic assumptions. These premises can
be seen as the “starting point on which all values and
actions are based” [11:3]. Yet, this oblivion impedes
the understanding of certain Artifacts as well as Espoused Beliefs and Values to become manifest.
Hence, to conclude why certain behavior occurs, one
must identify the facets of the underlying assumptions and principles that establish an organization
[24]. Apart from that, Schein argues that without understanding such assumptions it is not possible to
interpret most of the behavior within a firm and “particularly the seeming incongruity between intense
individualism and intense commitment to group work
and consensus” [26, p. 46] remains unobserved. Further, he illustrates the importance of assumptions
being connected because single elements of a paradigm cannot explain how an organization is able to
function, or change, respectively. The following example introduces such an Underlying Assumption
[26, p. 56]: “’giving someone unsolicited information
was like walking into their home uninvited’ came
from a number of managers in subsequent interviews.
It became clear that only if the information was asked
for was it acceptable to offer ideas. One’s superior
could provide information, though even that was
done only cautiously but a peer would rarely do so,
lest he unwittingly insults the recipient. To provide
unsolicited information or ideas could be seen as a
challenge to the information base the manager was
using, and that might be regarded as an insult, implying that the person challenged had not thought deeply
enough about his own problem or was not really on
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 A (Gearings) is very innovative. However, they perceive
digitalization to be a management fad. (Interview Partner
IP1; firm size/employees: 2,000)
 B (Online Bank) is a digital pioneer in developing digital
innovations. (IP2-4; 1,500)
 C (Press Outlet) seeks to digitalize its products but is
impeded by the firm’s publishers’ resistance. (IP5-7;350)
 D (Private Bank) stands out through integrating fintech
companies. (IP8-10; 80)
 E (Agriculture Technology) successfully digitalizes its
business clients’ farms in co-creation. (IP11-13; 18,000)
 F (Fund Services) is equipped with high financial resources but prone to resisting management. (IP14; 3,000)
 G (Retail Bank) is digitalizing through the creation of a
new digital unit. (IP15; 100,000)
 H (Construction Materials) has hired a digital native to
digitalize the firm’s products and process. (IP16-19; 700)
 I (Retail Bank) just appointed a chief digital officer for
digitalizing from within. (IP20; 15,000)
 J (Aviation)’s digital innovations are constrained by
legislative circumstances. (IP21-23; 2,000)
 K (Machinery) has a high volume in sales. Their digitalization efforts are hindered by ‘monarchs’. (IP24-27;
50,000)

Levels

Artifacts

We collected data in eleven case studies, conducting 27 exploratory interviews, in order to understand
how (Artifacts, and Espoused Beliefs and Values) and
why (Underlying Assumptions) firms redesign their
OC in times of digitalization (some of these firms are
very successful and some face difficulties). Based on
the recommendations of Eisenhardt [10] and Yin
[33], the interviews followed semi-structured guidelines with open-ended questions to assure the examination of every possible research direction. We contacted senior managers responsible for strategy,
R&D, innovation, IT, or marketing/sales from a variety of firms and asked for participation if the company publicly claimed initiatives regarding digitalization. In most cases we collected data from three different senior managers who agreed to participate. The
firms were not limited to any industry or size in order
to embrace differences in several sectors. In the following, we provide an overview of the cases (due to
the space limitations only a very brief overview is
presented):

Espoused
Beliefs and
Values

3. Research Approach

Interviews were conducted mostly onsite by two
or three of the authors. The analysis of organizational
efforts required us to create a trustful atmosphere by
guaranteeing absolute privacy and to focus on the
managers’ opinions. The interviews were conducted
and recorded in German. The interview guideline was
slightly updated during the interview cycle, to account for findings gathered from earlier interviews.
The interviews took place from November 2015 to
November 2016. All interviews were transcribed, and
project documentation, related reports, financial
statements, off-record notes, and observations were
used to augment and triangulate the interview data.
In the data analysis, we started with coding interpret
the data and wrote narratives, and eventually revisited literature. Following Miles and Huberman’s [18]
recommendations, this data analysis process was facilitated through the building of data displays in the
form of tables and matrices (coding in MaxQDA
v.12.2) to refine the concepts identified, and the development of tentative conclusions to capture the
identified facets. The data analysis began with open
coding, as soon as the first interviews were transcribed. It was done inductively, seeking to reflect
the data as closely as possible. This stage led to the
identification of over 1250 codings. Starting with the
theoretical lens of OC, we identified the relevant
concepts emerging from the data. Table 1 depicts
these three levels (column 1) and the corresponding
definitions according to Schein [26] (column 2), and
our application of the three levels (column 3).
Table 1. Levels of organizational culture

Underlying
Assumptions

top of his own job.“ This illustrates how statements
are recurrently evolving but require an interpretation.
In the following section, we explain our research
approach by stating how we integrated the results of
our study into the levels of OC [26]. Specifically, we
demonstrate how we structured the interviews’ and
firms’ data into the three levels.

Description

Application to our results

Artifacts deal with organizational attributes that
can be observed, felt, and
heard as an individual
enters a new culture.

In our study, Artifacts become manifest in the changing structures of digitalizing
firms. These are the facets
explicated by practitioners
regarding internal and external structure of their firms.
This level deals with the For digitalizing firms, we
espoused goals, ideals,
derived ‘digital’ goals and
norms, standards, and
norms which have been
moral principles and is
expressed as vital for a new
usually the level that can OC. These values are conbe captured through incentrating around the menterviews and questiontality and authority modes
naires.
towards digitalization.
This level deals with
Firms operating in the digiphenomena that remain
tal age are driven by central
unexplained when insid- tenets about digital innovaers are asked about the
tions that are recurrently
values of the OC. Inforaddressed in stories and
mation is gathered by
business reports within the
observing behavior care- cases. Abstracting these
fully to gather underlying stories allowed us to derive
assumptions because they four central assumptions.
are often taken for granted and not recognized.
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All codes of the data analysis were projected on
the two levels Artifacts as well as Espoused Beliefs
and Values of the concept of OC by identifying the
relevant facets in the codings. Furthermore, we triangulated all cases and abstracted the content of the
interviews to derive the third level Underlying Assumptions. Last, we have evaluated whether all identified Artifacts, as well as Espoused Beliefs and Values, conform to the respective case studies, and
whether they were exclusively reported in the context
of digitalization efforts of the firms. The overall process was highly iterative, moving between the levels
and the codes as well as between data and theory.
This approach allowed us to identify the facets of the
three levels of OC that accompany the digitalization
of firms regardless of the industry. Emergent foci
have been identified as to the particular design of the
questionnaire meaning that the identified findings in
the different levels of Schein’s model predominantly
revolve around the topics asked by following the research guideline.

4. Results
In this section, we present the facets that we identified by taking the theoretical lens of Edgar Schein’s
OC model (introduced in section 2) and applying it to
digitalizing firms. We allocated the set of initiatives
and managerial actions of the analyzed digitalizing
firms to the corresponding levels of Schein’s model.

4.1. Artifacts
According to Schein [26], organizational structures fall under the definition of Artifacts. Hence, the
altered structures we observed and analyzed due to
digitalization in the cases match Schein’s understanding of Artifacts. In our cases, OC in the digital age
rests on novel ways of internal collaboration (namely:
cross-functional teams, physical and virtual collaboration, and dual structures) and external collaboration
(startups, platforms with competitors and partners,
and customer integration).
First, in eight out of eleven cases we found evidence that firms form cross-functional teams that
are composed of different operational functions. This
relatively high number of occurrences within our
sample indicates that cross-functional teams are a
popular best practice in digitalizing firms. Such
teams are designed to reduce conflicts and possible
confusion between the functions. Furthermore, a
more integrated view of different functions is needed
to ensure faster innovation cycles. Hence, the procedure is characterized by mutual adjustment to the
development of new products or processes. Thereby,

collaboration concentrates on a horizontal basis,
which puts people from IT, marketing etc. at one table. As a result, cross-functional teams allow for
“everyone to have transparency over everything”
(IP15) and to form special teams for dedicated tasks
with the needed input and know-how from different
functions as the following quotation shows.
Cross-functional teams are a form of collaboration where “for every decision, no matter whether it
is IT or marketing, everybody sits together. Marketing is not sitting by themselves and deciding about
marketing, but we sit together in one big round […]
ten to twelve people. All the decisions are discussed”
(Chief Executive Officer of Case G, IP15).
Next, in six cases collaboration broadens from
physical to virtual collaboration. The importance of
teamwork in the office without walls is almost equally important to teamwork happening virtually, i.e.,
independently from space and time. Physical collaboration builds on a “restructuring of the office space
with the elimination of isolated departments and the
creation of space where everyone sits together”
(IP02). Wide spaces without boundaries and demanding people to mingle together are justified as
knowledge is more easily shared within units than
between them, even when activities within a unit are
distant from each other.
Physical and virtual collaboration are strongly
needed, but managers feel “currently we do not have
those ‘remote working’ people, who are delivering
something from the home office or from Indonesia.
This form of collaboration, working together with
distant people, is currently a great challenge”
(Product Group Manager of Case E, IP11).
Third, we observed dual structures in six of the
eleven cases, which build on the concept of ambidextrous organizations where breakthrough innovations
must be balanced with evolutionary improvements of
existing products or solutions. Here, the balance between digital innovations and development of the
core business are needed to reach the combination of
‘the best of two worlds’. Dual speed mechanisms
separate the organizational structure into two parts
with different foci. In our cases, the separation goes
as far as two different locations where the predominant difference is speed. The traditional core functions (part 1) still focus on traditional physical products less impacted by digitalization and, hence, require a lower speed of adaptation and change. These
activities are operated with more traditional waterfall-like development methods and a greater longterm orientation. Contrary, the speed of innovation
largely increases for business functions closer to the
customer (part 2). Teams use agile product development approaches to constantly incorporate changes.
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As a result, firms “operate at two speeds with the
goal to reach again one speed in the future” (IP18).
The dual structure is a new organizational structure where managers would “follow two strategies
simultaneously. So, I can say, on the one hand, I also
have here a clear development of the structure and
parallel […] I would start a competition with an acquisition that can do that already” (Head of Automation and Controls of Case E, IP12).
Furthermore, the Artifacts of the OC do not only
require new internal structures but also stronger external collaboration. We found in eight of our cases
that through the collaboration with startups firms
can profit from the dynamics in the market and gain
knowledge that was not accessible previously.
Startups can help the firms to accelerate their product
innovation and can infect them with their entrepreneurial spirit. Hence, firms continue with their integration aspiration of external partners and use different ownership models ranging from joint-venture to
acquisition in order to improve collaboration [17].
Furthermore, firms extend their collaboration with
financial investments in startups, which allows them
“to secure strategic partnerships with a financial
involvement” (IP18) and with the goal to “genuinely
cooperate with Fintechs for many years” (IP14). Furthermore, firms are offering new products and innovations to startups for further development of the idea
and increasing knowledge exchange.
We observed collaboration with startups where
“the focus clearly lies on finding fin tech companies,
with whom we can cooperate, in the sense, that we
can improve our business for the customer” (Chief
Marketing Manager of Case H, IP18).
Next to startups, in five out of eleven cases, we
observe firms strengthening their external collaboration efforts towards establishing platforms with
partners and competitors. Platforms are perceived
as an organizational structure, in the widest sense, to
gather different partners in one central place and enhance the exchange between partners. These partners
are then used to infuse the traditional products of
firms with digital capabilities externally provided.
Examples are firms producing traditional machinery
partnering with IT partners for sensor technology
(IP11). The partners allow the firms to compete with
startups on an equal playing field which would not be
the case without partners. The external collaboration
goes as far as to include competitors, where firms try
to partner for special applications or to increase market boundaries. In the end, external collaboration
often culminates in a platform where the different
entities come together. Platforms are seen as a way
for open exchange where firms can let their products
be “tested and refined” (IP14). Furthermore, plat-

forms are used to ensure the sharing, transparency,
and integrity of data via different partners. Collaboration builds on external support from “[…] platform[s], where we are participating as a partner with
others. That is also driven in the interest of the customers to establish a platform where firms are working together with others, like app developers, to produce various things” (Product Group Manager of
Case E, IP11).
Finally, in all cases, firms’ collaboration efforts
do not longer exclude the customer. Specifically, in
seven of our cases, the Artifacts of OC include ways
to integrate customers into the innovation chain and
external collaboration. Hence, those firms are aiming
for ‘co-creation’ with their customers where customers and firms are developing products jointly (IP14).
Hence, direct feedback loops are implemented and
the organizational structure provides a lot of interaction between employees and customers. The early integration of customers via customer product presentations and beta-testers allows generating reference
customers, which test and review new products for
other customers. Reference customers are provided
with more information from the core of the product
development and can support the firms’ marketing
better than if firms have to confer, “we have only
tested it in the lab but it should work” (IP12). In the
end, the collaboration with customers is the best to
fully develop the product to the end and build final
touches on feedback from integrated customers.
Firms are extending their external collaboration to
the customers “because we are clearly saying, ok, if
we are looking at the tension between time and content, we don’t want to say, that the trend is necessarily going towards ‘banana product’, which mainly
ripe with the customer, but we see a shift of the ripening phase from internal to external” (Head of Automation and Controls of Case E, IP12).

4.2. Espoused Beliefs and Values
Espoused Beliefs and Values, as the second level
of OC, cover soft factors which are hard to anchor in
rules or specifications, but which have to be valued
and lived by the employees [27]. Organizational beliefs and values are a vital component of an OC and
can contribute to a firm’s sustainable competitive
advantage [2].
First, in eight out of eleven cases, we distilled a
startup mentality, which is conceptualized as a very
collaborative way of working with little to no formalization, less hierarchy, higher adaptiveness to change,
and strong customer focus [3]. In order to do so, the
startup mentality builds on the ability to channel resources to new projects and supports the generation
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of new ideas to solve customer problems. These ideas
are submitted from all levels of the organization and
the idea generation is integrated into the work tasks
of everyone. This mentality is usually only found in
startups since established firms have difficulties in
incorporating values which are usually found in
smaller, less mature firms like direct communication
and greater openness.
Creating a startup mentality is a novel approach to
enable digitalization and the goal is “that this mindset is ideally with every employee. This is, as far as I
know, important for the overall process – especially
to the question: Where are the ideas coming from?
How are we dealing with the idea? […] What is happening in the world? […] Each employee can submit
improvements.” Chief Technical Officer of Case B
(IP04).
These values are closely connected to digital innovation and are believed to trigger new product development. For instance, one practitioner explained
that they are establishing a place with values “where
colleagues can come up with something completely
different” (IP03). This “bravery to try out new
things” (IP04) is rooted in a startup mentality which
connotes the concept of intrapreneurship [1].
In seven of the cases, we identified the consequent further development to a culture where failures are accepted. The so-called ‘failure culture’
motivates employees to take risks and try out new
things even if negative effects might be the result.
Employees are encouraged to build prototypes which
focus primarily on the direct customer experience
without engineering the product until the end (IP03)
and possibly risking to over-engineer the product.
Failure culture requires accepting something that
does not go as planned and to “believe in it anyway”
where “we will lead it to success against all the odds,
even if it might take longer.“ (Innovation Manager of
Case A, IP01).
In order to cultivate such a mindset, resting on a
greater startup feeling and acceptance of failure, we
found in six cases that employees embrace digital
skills which they do not have at the moment. These
firms question “if we have the needed skills to develop money-making business models” (IP 11). Hence,
they are looking for “people with digital skills”
(IP11) who entrench digital values and favor digital
solutions. In the end, the required skill set has certainly changed (IP05), demanding new skills and an
open mindset to digital technology. On one hand,
firms are satisfying their need for new skills by developing and reassessing available skills internally
(IP20), on the other hand, they are acquiring new
skills externally from the labor market (IP04).

A digital world requires firms to embrace digital
skills where “we had and have capabilities in the
firm [publisher] which are mainly no longer needed
in this way. […] we need completely different people
now who can work for the firm. But this shift happens
very slowly.” (Head of Business Development of
Case C, IP04).
In order to support the organizational structure of
firms (e.g., the Artifacts), even the most fundamental
values like power structure within firms [19] and
decision-making mechanisms do change. Finally, the
role of IT is empowered allowing digital demands to
be reflected in the values, too. In eight cases, we observed firms that support power equality amongst
employees and across the hierarchy. Power and the
responsibilities are distributed in those firms across
business units to improve the alignment of digital
innovation processes. We learned that with agile development frameworks like Scrum, responsibilities of
each employee are clearer and the new role system is
favored by the employees (IP05). Generally, the
power is more distributed in the firm and around the
individual employees. Hence, power has moved towards the middle and lower management and is less
concentrated at the top, which allows a faster reaction
to change in the business environment. Furthermore,
power is also given to the lowest hierarchy level as
“each employee can make improvements” (IP04) and
thereby contribute.
Equal power might raise questions at the beginning of “Who is actually responsible for the product?
Is it the publisher? Is it the development department?
Or is it the editorial team?”, but allows everybody to
contribute in a structured way. “Now in the agile
world, the roles are still clearly assigned. […] Product owners and the editorial team are developing
stories together. […] And developers implement
them.“ (Deputy General Manager of Case C, IP05).
Further, the next value in the digital age, visible
in seven out of eleven cases, is active practicing of
mutual decision-making. Where it was easy in the
past to separate decision-making with respect to the
department, decisions are now made jointly and historical separations are given up (IP05). Furthermore,
we see decisions being made at lower levels and are,
hence, more distributed in the firm. Decisions are
then aggregated in order to match the overall firm’s
objectives.
Mutual decisions eliminate previously established
boundaries between business and IT as now “it is
much more technological. And we recognize that it is
not something where we can keep up the separation.
[…] We have to overcome the past and we must actually collaborate much more intensively” (IT and
Deputy General Manager of Case C, IP05).
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We observed changes in the perception of IT in
all cases. The role of the IT unit does fundamentally
change where firms are undergoing changes in the
organization due to digitalization. Specifically, in
seven cases, the new role of IT is best described as:
IT as a business creator. IT is cutting loose from
traditional ties to a service provider role (focused on
receiving orders from business) and moves into a
more independent role where it actively designs essential features of new products during the innovation
process. As a result, “IT is now playing a very crucial
role” (IP02). This goes as far as IT now being integrated with business units in decision-making around
new products. More competencies are delegated to IT
and IT is developing to a respected and equal partner
for the development of new online service or digitally
enhanced products. Contrary to the traditional view
where IT was seen as an order taker, the new role of
IT is the driver of digital initiatives in the firm (IP18)
and digital enabler for new products (IP05).
In a digital world, IT is now seen as a business
creator and is “no longer responsible for the maintenance of the server, nor are we the person who is
called if a projector is not working“ (IT and Deputy
General Manager of Case C, IP05).

4.3. Underlying Assumptions
In this section, we present the Underlying Assumptions that deal with the phenomena that remain
unexplained when experts are asked about characteristics of organizational culture [26]. Therefore, we
critically reflected and triangulated the interviews
with the OC literature to arrive at the Underlying
Assumptions. We abstracted the central issues of
digitalizing firms from the facets of the Artifacts as
well as Espoused Beliefs and Values (hence, they are
presented along with direct quotes from the interview
in italic). We used the input given in the interviews to
interpret what the analyzed firms have in common
and present our four central results as Underlying
Assumptions in accordance with Schein [26]:
The first underlying assumption identified in our
research is: We are lacking skills needed for digitalization, and, even worse, often digital talents favor hip
competitors (i.e., ‘Perceived Need for Digital
Skills’). In all cases, we recognized difficulties in
attracting the sparse but highly qualified talents with
the needed digital or IT background. Digitalizing
firms have to recognize that their current OC does not
meet the requirements of the employees these firms
are currently targeting. Hence, firms are engaging in
the war for talent and try to be attractive for digital
talents. Only with the right human resources, they
assume to be prepared for the future. What we ob-

served is that firms adopt fairly uncommon values to
create atmospheres digital talents feel comfortable in.
As such firms try to attract young technology-affine
employees by reaching for more equally distributed
power to trigger employees own decision-making or
by providing conveniences, usually only found in
startups like pool tables, fridges with fruits, scooters,
and coffee shops. Further, they adopt a failure culture, i.e. allowing to test risky ideas without being
sanctioned, to motivate employees to try out new
things and come up with novel solutions. Moreover,
OC is redefined by new forms of collaboration with
partners to source the required skills from the outside, eventually aiming at their transition.
The second Underlying Assumption that evolves
from our interviews is: We feel a pressure from demanding customers who request the affordances of
smart, connected products (i.e., ‘Increasingly Demanding Digital Customers’). Many firms perceive
that they need to exploit the new affordances of
smart, connected products, i.e. continuous development, continuous monitoring, post-hoc adaptation,
product-as-a-service, cross-product integration [cf.
22] in order to stand the test of digitalization. These
affordances allow for novel approaches to engage
with customers in digitalized ways for their convenience. This is combined with the fear that firms that
do not adopt a digital culture, e.g., adopting the identified Artifacts and Values, may lose customers to
competitors that provide these convenient affordances. Thus, most of our interview partners mingle product development employees with IT employees in
cross-functional teams to combine the skills and capabilities to integrate ‘digital materiality’ into nondigital products and the know-how to handle digitalized products. Further, traditional firms radically flatten their hierarchies to allow mutual decision-making
for faster reaction and joint decisions on new products. The failure culture encourages employees to
integrate their ideas to enable faster innovations.
The third Underlying Assumption is: We need
improved agility to react faster to changes and to
protect ourselves from faster competitors (i.e., ‘Necessity for Increased Agility’). Due to the fact that
digital transformations are unpredictable [32] and
technological uncertainty in general [9], firms face
uncertainties from ‘everything’ being digitalized
(e.g., shoes, fridges, cars, bottles of wines, etc.). This
trend incurs the need for more agility in order to react
quickly to threatening competitors and to defend a
firm by transforming the firm. Eventually, improved
agility is achieved through internal and external collaboration, but also through equal power distribution
which strongly empowers the employees by integrating their ideas into new innovations. Hence, firms
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establish cross-functional teams to collate knowledge
sets from different disciplines, and to spur numerous
and more creative ideas. This is complemented by
introducing a startup mentality which is more open
and inclusive to new ideas. Again, in order to speed
up decision-making processes when developing new
solutions firms delegate decisions down to lowerlevel employees. Furthermore, collaboration with
customers is being established to receive faster feedback to, once again, further enhance digital products.
Fourth, the following basic assumption emerged
from our research: We need to understand IT and its
employees as an integral part of the product we sell
(i.e., ‘Buoyant Integration of IT into Innovating’).
From our case studies, we learned that the business
side of firms is frequently focusing strongly on traditional sales procedures while neglecting the digital
transformation. Without eradicating barriers created
through the legacy and stopping power games by
resistant managers, firms will find it hard to recognize IT as an essential part of digital innovations. We
learned that firms try to realize their digitalization by
reducing retarding forces (identifying digital skills,
equalizing power distribution), and increasing accelerating forces (getting support from everybody from

top management to lower level like in a startup and
finding new organizational structures). Firms address
these ‘crusts’ by adopting a failure culture that promotes mistakes because one can learn from them.
Although some managers still perceive IT as a service unit that focuses on helpdesk tasks, we observed
the need to establish a ‘Digital IT’ [15] or IT as a
business creator which has strong implications for
the role of IT. In order to integrate digital capabilities
into previously non-digital products, firms need to
place people with IT and business background in
cross-functional teams on projects and assure an atmosphere of mutual power, trust, and respect to allow
for digitalizing firms to develop products that integrate both digital and physical materiality. In Figure
1, we provide an overview of how Artifacts, Espoused Beliefs and Values, and Underlying Assumptions appear in the ‘Digital Organizational Culture’.
We arrived at this depiction by relating the statements that were identified as Artifacts or Values and
Beliefs to the topic that was convened on in the interview guideline. Hence, the Underlying Assumptions
were the underlying reasons for the particular Artifact
or Values and Belief to be mentioned (which we indicate through the arrows in the overview model):

Figure 1. Digital organizational culture

5. Implications and Limitations
To our knowledge, this analysis is the first to
identify the facets of OC in digitalizing firms.
Through extracting initiatives and managerial actions
from 27 interviews in eleven digitalizing firms, we
have learned what firms undertake on the Artifacts
level (i.e., cross-functional teams, physical and virtual collaboration, dual structures, collaboration with
startups, platform business with partners and compet-

itors, and customer integration; cf. Section 4.1) and
on the level of Espoused Beliefs and Values (i.e.,
startup mentality, failure culture, embracing digital
skills, power equality, mutual decision-making, and
IT as a business creator; cf. Section 4.2) to digitalize
their firms. Further, a process of profound interpretation and abstraction allowed us to derive four Underlying Assumptions (i.e., perceived need for digital
skills, increasingly demanding digital customers, the
necessity for increased agility, and buoyant integraPage 5133

tion of IT into innovating; cf. Section 4.3) from an
extensive set of empirical data. We conclude that
these assumptions form the intrinsic motivations for
firms to digitalize and present forces in digitalizing
firms. According to Schein [26] these forces are
powerful because they operate under limited awareness and can explain the new OC currently developed
in digitalizing firms.
We have also captured the relation of business
and IT units in digitalizing firms. When previously
non-digital products (consisting only of physical materiality) are enriched with digital materiality [35],
firms need to reconsider how they organize for innovating [36]. Consequently, we found that previously
non-digital development teams (consisting only of
conventional business functions) are enriched with
digital skills (IT professionals). Starting from the
Artifacts level, several initiatives and managerial
actions (e.g., cross-functional teams, physical and
virtual collaboration, and dual structures) indicate
that managers increasingly integrate IT professionals
into the development of digital innovations. These IT
professionals come either from within the firm or
through the integration of startups or hiring professionals (some firms build digital units or appoint new
chief digital officers for this integration). This is
complemented by adopting a set of Espoused Values
and Beliefs (e.g., startup mentality, failure culture)
that further pronounces the practices from software
development (i.e., digital skills) in previously nondigital development teams. Following, the boundary
between business and IT functions dissolves in digitalizing firms because the relation between employees of IT and business is being internalized in crossfunctional teams and no longer delineated by traditional unit boundaries. This perspective deviates from
classical perspectives [16, 17] as the relationships
between organizational units are replaced by relations
between individuals with different capabilities within
the cross-functional team. Thus, boundaries among
organizational units disappear.
From these contributions, we derive the following
implications for practice: First, firms may follow the
examples collated from our cases and place employees from IT and business functions in one team for
developing digital innovations. The rationale is bringing knowledge resources (from the physical and digital materiality perspective) closer together and removing internal boundaries between them. Second,
practitioners can use our results to evaluate which
Artifacts, as well as Espoused Values and Beliefs, are
beneficial to them, and deploy them when they are
digitalizing and start the development of digital innovations. Third, digitalizing firms are facing greater
uncertainty due to technological changes, knowledge

intense tasks, and high-performance expectations.
Therefore, the hierarchy is now often only exceptionally employed since the number of exceptions increases until hierarchy becomes overloaded [10].
Hence, firms shift their forms of coordination towards mutual adjustment [19] because they are better
suited for knowledge workers who possess fungible
knowledge that is not limited to a specific task but
applicable to a wide range of activities [22].
Besides the implications, there are also some limitations of our work. First, the results may appear to
be ‘cherry-picked’ as we could not use a chronological structure nor an order based on popularity due to
the heterogeneity of our cases and interviewees. Yet,
we account for that by taking a theoretical lens [27],
following this lens’ aspects, and validating the coding
between the researchers. Second, Schein [26] introduces a multitude of aspects for each level which are
not necessarily mutually exclusive; thus, we adopted
the concepts as they matched best. Third, the authors
have conducted interviews with managers in eleven companies which will prevent a deep understanding of the situation in each company. Organizational
culture is not an easy concept to understand and two
or three interviews for each company may not be
enough. We avert this aspect by triangulating company reports, and additional data that we retrieved from
the firms under scrutiny.
Last, we investigated firms from different but not
all industries, which may raise concerns due to generalizability. Although, we acknowledge this ongoing
debate, we are in accordance with Schwarz et al. [28]
who claim that few cases have the benefit of providing more thoroughness in the analysis process.
On the other hand, while including firms from
different industries might blend and even obfuscate
many contextual factors such as regulation intensity
and particular industry or professional cultures, our
aim is to take a more cross-sectional perspective and
identify constituents of a digital organizational culture. Based on our results we see promising avenues
for future research in looking deeper into these constituents and how their interplay with particularities
of various industries shape the respective digitalization landscapes.
Hence, research and practice should further investigate the ‘digital organizational culture’ so that firms
are able to consciously shape it. Then, organizational
actors can restructure Artifacts and Espoused Beliefs
and Values for combining physical and digital components as well as capabilities to develop digital innovations. Consequently, understanding the manifestation of a ‘digital organizational culture’ is necessary
for digitalizing the firm in a comprehensive way.
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